Meanwhile, back in Taiwan... Economy Still in Doldrums, in case you hadn't noticed.

Rust.

The statistics bureau threw in the towel this week and sent the economic forecast below 2%...

The economy may grow by less than 2 percent for a second consecutive year after the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) yesterday cut its GDP growth forecast for this year to 1.74 percent.

The agency’s latest forecast is 0.57 percentage points lower than the forecast of 2.31 percent it made in August and is the lowest among domestic economic institutes.

Several trends -- less manufacturing here, more Chinese local production supplanting Taiwanese goods, lower exports to the US economy, whose elites have completely mismanaged it, and of course, the salary squeeze here in Taiwan means poor consumption growth. D'oh. The whole economy must suffer so a few wealthy people can accumulate far more than they can ever need or use.

Some observations on the state of Taiwan's manufacturing:

In October, the island's year-on-year exports declined for the second month, following a steep 7-percent drop in September .

Export orders, however, which are indicators of future demand, have risen for four consecutive months, including a better-than-expected 3.16-percent gain in October .

Orders from China, Taiwan's top export market, climbed 3.2 percent, while those from the United States registered a strong 9-percent gain on year-end holiday demand.

Taiwan's industrial output also gained over the past two months, despite having fallen in six months since the beginning of the year, according to Thomson Reuters data.

TIER offers a more pessimistic evaluation, however.

In October, Taiwan's exports totaled US$26.12 billion, down 1.5% from a year earlier, while its imports fell 1.3% year-on-year to US$22.6 billion.

TIER said that while Taiwan's manufacturing industrial production index — an indicator of real production output — and export orders for October picked up slightly, the positive leads were not strong enough to offset the impact from weak exports and imports.

In November, the pricing power sub-index — which measures the ability to profitably raise the market price of goods over marginal cost — rose 0.05 points and the demand sub-index rose 0.04 points, from a month earlier, while the business environment sub-index fell 0.72 points, the raw material investments sub-index fell 0.56 points and the costs sub-index 0.01 points, TIER said.

The President continues to flounder, having bet the farm on deeper economic relations with China, which have benefited only a few wealthy families and cross-strait organized crime. Next year are local elections....
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Daily Links:

• Excellent: Ben notes that observers now wonder when Beijing will lose patience with Ma. What does that imply about the Chen Administration and the media. 
• Cold snap claims over 30 lives.
• Ma Administration criticizes ADIZ. !!
• In a strange case, an infant is poisoned by putting salt in its formula.
• Taiwan orchid breeders falter in China

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

More on the ADIZ

My first half-decent photo of Venus.

Lots of stuff out there. This Volokh Conspiracy post has good links to other posts and resources and notes:

China’s assertion of an ADIZ, as Julian Ku says, is not per se impermissible. But the devil is in the details. China’s ADIZ raises two large questions of legality. First, the “not-impermissible” scope of an ADIZ, that which is accepted in widespread state practice, is a projection outwards from the coastline of a coastal state. One might argue as a matter of international law as evidenced by state practice that a ADIZ has to bear a reasonable relationship to that coastline and the protection of its sovereignty, in the sense of both national security and domestic regulation (e.g., air traffic management, anti-smuggling, etc.). Those requirements can be fluid, addressing the nature of technology and threats to sovereignty, while still being “reasonably” connected to the protection of the sovereign coastline from unlawful encroachment.

Whatever can reasonably be projected as an ADIZ related to the coastal state’s coastline, the legality of an ADIZ created in such a way as to allow China to assert a new legal claim regarding contested rocks far out at sea has to be considered at issue. It’s a “bootstrapping” claim, assuming its conclusion: China declares an ADIZ around a contested territory, and then uses that as a basis to control the airspace as though it were an ADIZ declared along its uncontested home coastline. But an ADIZ cannot create sovereign territory or vindicate a claim to it. Unfortunately, enforcing that fundamental point requires that other states ignore and denounce the ADIZ – in the teeth of a threat, implied or express, that whatever regulatory terms China has dictated (see below) will be enforced.

Whereas it seems clear that state practice is limited to uncontested home territory. No bootstrapping. The virtue of an ADIZ is that it can reduce risks of confrontation, mistake, and dangerous brinksmanship as aircraft come close to unquestionably sovereign, territorial airspace by regularizing the passage of civilian aircraft, especially, as either intending (in which case ADIZ procedures apply) or not intending to enter the sovereign’s airspace (in which case ADIZ procedures do not apply) is turned into a mechanism for contesting sovereignty, and becomes a pretext for confrontation.

It's so like China to follow the letter while subverting the spirit of the procedure. The whole post is excellent.

The ADIZ also shows how the US policy on the Senkakus has now impaired its own response. It can't take a strong position and point out that the Senkakus are sovereign Japanese territory because for years the US hasn't taken a position on the "dispute" (the US might even consider retaliating by recognizing Japan's sovereignty formally). D'oh! Once again, failure to do the right thing ramifies....

The BBC reports that the US has required its carriers to comply with the ADIZ. But when you read it closely...

But on Friday, the state department said the US government "generally expects that US carriers operating internationally will operate consistent with Notams [Notices to Airmen] issued by foreign countries".

It added: "Our expectation of operations by US carriers consistent with NOTAMs does not indicate U.S. government acceptance of China's requirements for operating in the newly declared ADIZ."

The US position is that its carriers should behave as they do in all other ADIZs and ignore Beijing's special reporting requirements. Nope, they are complying with Beijing's demands. The Volokh piece above gives other examples of how normal the US military response is. The BBC piece contains a little tidbit:

South Korea claims a submerged rock, known as Ieodo, also within the zone.

If China is "boostrapping" the ADIZ as a form of territorial claim.... no wonder the Koreans are suspicious.
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Hegemonic Conflict Watch: China's ADIZ roundup

Took the Motao out to Shihlin Night Market the other day.

So much commentary -- apparently China's new ADIZ woke the world up. We've arrived at one of those historical moments when even the densest dunderheads can see, a Panay moment, or a remilitarization of the Rhineland moment, when onlookers are beginning to realize the coming course of events....

...China has already scrambled planes in response to US and Japanese flights, Chinese media reports. Japan denies this.

Lots of good stuff out there. Corey Wallace over at China Policy Institute observes:

The Chinese government is increasingly perceived in Japan to be implementing a calculated and “staged” approach to undermining Japan’s claims to the Senkaku Islands, and using antipathy towards Japan as a justification for pursuing a more expansive military policy. For example, in September 2012, the PRC submitted to the United Nations the coordinates for demarcating the territorial seas around the islands. This was identified a precursor to maintaining a routine presence in and around the islands, and since this point incursions in the territorial waters around the islands have rapidly increased. Just two days prior to the ADIZ announcement, it was reported in Japan that Chinese maritime authorities had escalated the stakes again by boarding Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ waters around the Senkaku Islands. It was confirmed by the JCG that this had happened three times since August, 2013. The ADIZ will therefore be interpreted as a signal of a Chinese intention to further implement its jurisdictional claim.

Indeed, Japanese media has been quick to explore the dangerous implications of the new ADIZs. For example, the Yomiuri labelled China’s action of declaring an ADIZ that includes airspace over islands under the administrative control of another nation to be of “an unusual nature in the international community.” The ADIZ move is seen as providing further evidence of Xi Jinping prioritising China’s “great power” ambitions, rather than steering China towards becoming a cooperative player in building a mutually beneficial East Asian regional framework. Xi’s advocacy for a “New Type of Great Power Relations” for managing future diplomacy, which excludes the interests of regional and global players other than the United States or the PRC, has also not gone unnoticed in Japan. The Japanese media has even reported that various Chinese diplomatic sources have admitted that hard line elements within the Chinese government and the PLA have settled on a strategy to challenge Japan on the Senkakus, to drive a wedge through the US-Japan alliance, and take a hard-line towards relations towards Japan in general. This strategy was apparently consolidated at the end of the recent third plenum, which saw China setting up a National Security Council, and Xi Jinping noting that China needed to directly face external and internal threats to China’s sovereign rights and national security. As such, the East China Sea ADIZ will be seen as setting the stage for a long-term exercising of military influence in the area, especially if the PRC goes on to announce a similar zone for the South China Sea. With the maiden South China Sea voyage of the Liaoning also being heavily reported in Japan, Japanese politicians and officials have quickly moved to discussing extending Japan’s own ADIZ eastwards to cover the Ogasawara islands in anticipation of future Chinese aerial activity on the back of its new ability to project aerial power.

Michal Thim at CPI similarly observes:

There is another important aspect to consider while analysing recent Chinese actions. Beijing may be motivated to take a stance in regards to its sovereignty claim and it is consistently pushing the envelope in this matter. However, it is also interested in testing the reactions of the U.S. and its allies to get a clearer picture for its actions in the future. The Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1995/96 might have backfired and in the short term it was Beijing’s debacle but at the same time Chinese leaders tested U.S. reaction. In addition, the crisis provided critical stimulus for the development of Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capability that nowadays represents significant challenge for any future deployment of carrier battle group near Chinese shores. More recently, during 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff with the Philippines, China has tested whether the U.S. would go beyond rhetorical support of its treaty ally when the subject of dispute is relatively insignificant elevation. Creation of ADIZ and increased number of naval and air incursions in the disputed area should be understood as part of broader strategy to change the status quo. Should the ADIZ face no strong reaction or should the extent of backlash be acceptable for Beijing, second ADIZ may come soon, this time over the South China Sea.

At the Diplomat, the really bizarre writing:

The islands, when referenced in Chinese historical documents, are generally considered to have been part of the administrative zone of Taiwan. In other words, if mainland China does gain control of the islands, it would effectively be administering part of Taiwan. Obviously, this give the dispute a deep symbolic meaning for Taiwan’s government.

The was never any administration of the Senkakus from Taiwan. That's a post-1971 lie. Where do people get this crap? -- especially since several of us have now published at The Diplomat showing that these are lies. Do they not consult their own stuff? The writer does make one good point, however:

In this context, Beijing’s ADIZ could have lasting ramification for cross-strait relations. The PRC seems not to have considered the potential backlash on Taiwan — particularly since the ADIZ roll-out occurred only days before an important visit to Taiwan by Chen Deming, the head of the mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. The timing of the announcement has marred Chen’s visit. The DPP and other critics have demanded that Ma lodge protests with Chen and even expel him from Taiwan if his response is seen as inadequate.

Beijing could easily have avoided this by holding off on the ADIZ for even a week, or even done Ma a political favor by informing him of the decision in advance. Instead, mainland officials missed an opportunity to ease the political shock in Taiwan. As a result, China’s aggressive move to solidify its claims over some uninhabited rocks might jeopardize its chances at a far larger prize — eventual unification with Taiwan.

Exactly -- the ADIZ not only screwed Korea, it also screwed Beijing's friend and ally, Ma Ying-jeou. The ROC government has announced that it will go along with the requirement of reporting its airlines movements in the ADIZ to Beijing, unlike Korea, Japan, and the US. Speaking of Korea, at The Diplomat resides a piece on the ADIZ and Korea:

The beauty of a unilateral move like an ADIZ is that the country imposing the zone gets to decide how the lines are drawn on the map. The Chinese decision to draw the ADIZ such that it was guaranteed to raise the ire of South Korea is odd. With South Korea, the PRC was fortunate enough to avoid the sorts of territorial rigmaroles it often finds itself in with Japan, Taiwan and various Southeast Asian states (over the South China Sea). South Korea and China had also found themselves converging over their common historical distaste for Japan along nationalist lines — a phenomenon abetted by the almost concomitant election of conservative Park Geun-hye in Korea and Shinzo Abe in Japan.

It’s perhaps too early to make a definitive determination about the impact the Chinese ADIZ will have on future relations between China and South Korea. South Korea’s restrained rhetorical response and China’s immediate attempts to set the record straight on Ieodo indicate that the ADIZ’s northeastern frontier, near Jeju-do, may have been an oversight on China’s part.

..........

What should give South Korea pause over the ADIZ is the possible imposition of such zones in the future by China, something Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesman Yang Yujun claimed was in the pipes: “China will establish other Air Defense Identification Zones at the right moment after necessary preparations are completed.” A future ADIZ off the Bohai Sea and into the Yellow Sea would have serious implications for South Korean security

For me the scariest article was a WaPo piece on it by Simon Denyer, which reads as if it softened something dictated by Xinhua propagandists:

It was designed as a forceful response to Japanese assertiveness. [Hahahaha - mt] But Beijing’s creation of an air defense zone may have backfired, experts said, eliciting a strong joint response from the United States and Japan.

In Chinese eyes, the standoff began in September 2012, [Why are we regurgitating Chinese propaganda? Who cares what Beijing wants outsiders to think? Don't we do our own research? - mt] when the Japanese government purchased three of the islands — known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in China — from a private Japanese landowner. In response, Beijing stepped up its own claims to the rocky landmasses, increasing sea patrols and pressing Japan to accept that the territory is disputed.[Reality: the Japanese purchase was driven by China's escalating pressure. - mt]

This next bit is so comical it deserves to stand alone:

Beijing’s actions appear to fit a recent pattern, experts said. Reluctant to be seen as the provocateur, China tends to respond forcefully to what it sees as provocations from others and then advance its own claims even more strongly.

A totally Beijing-centric presentation. Ugly to see this in a US newspaper... but expect more in the future: the new normal is going to be US media presentations shaped by Beijing's power.

Finally, James Fallows has a good piece over at The Atlantic:

3) Is this likely to do China any good? The puzzling nature of Chinese foreign policy, especially its generally self-defeating "soft power" aspects, is a subject too vast for our purposes right now. In brief: the very steps that, from an internal Chinese-government perspective, are intended to make it seem confident, powerful, and attractive often have exactly the opposite effect on audiences outside China.

One famous illustration followed the world financial crisis of 2008. The Chinese economy recovered much more quickly than others; the U.S. looked like a house of cards; and the Chinese military made a number of expansionist-seeming moves in the South China Sea that quickly got the attention of neighboring countries. The result of this "over-reach" episode, as it is described now even in China, was to bring Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and other countries into closer alignment with the U.S. than they had thought necessary before. By acting super-tough, the Chinese military made its real situation weaker.

This ADIZ case may become the next famous example. Whether it seems, either now or later, worthwhile from the Chinese leadership's perspective I have no idea. But at least in the short term, it appears to have alarmed the South Koreans, with whom Chinese relations had been steadily warming, plus introducing new friction into China's most important relationship, which is with the United States.

Great stuff. UPDATED: And don't miss this piece on the Chinese perspective from a Chinese PHD student in the China Policy Institute.

The Lew-Rockwell Antiwar.com types are still off in some La-la land where all evils are due to the US and China is all rainbows and unicorns, but I noticed that over at the progressive website CommonDreams writer Gwynne Dyer actually thought the ADIZ was deliberately provocative. I'm remaining optimistic that the Left will come around on China...
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Hegemonic Conflict Watch: US Responds to China's ADIZ =UPDATED=

Wow (Yahoo):

Two US B-52 bombers flew over a disputed area of the East China Sea without informing Beijing, US officials said Tuesday, challenging China's bid to create an expanded air defense zone.

The flight of the giant Stratofortress planes sent a clear signal that Washington would push back against what it considers an aggressive stance by Beijing in the region.

The move also represented a robust show of US support for Japan, which is locked in a mounting dispute with Beijing over disputed islands in the East China Sea.

The unarmed bombers took off from Guam on Monday on a scheduled flight, as part of what defense officials insisted was a routine exercise dubbed "Coral Lightning Global Power Training Sortie."

This was exactly the right move. China still nurses fantasies of splitting Japan from the US, while pursuing policies that are actually driving Tokyo closer to Washington. The time when Beijing could have wooed Tokyo passed several years ago, thanks to Beijing's belligerent attitude...

One function of this ADIZ declaration is thus to show Tokyo that Washington won't support it in the pinch. This move has precedent -- at least one motive for the Sino-Vietnamese War was for Beijing to demonstrate that the treaty between Hanoi and Moscow was simply a worthless piece of paper. There too China's ostensible motive was islands (Spratly Islands) and alleged mistreatment of ethnic Chinese minorities in Vietnam, eerie echoes of China's bogus claim to the Senkakus and its claim that Taiwan should be part of China because they are all one big happy culture.

Hence, Washington's move was exactly the right move -- giving the middle finger to Beijing, but not using something more aggressive, like a fighter sweep. Kudos to the White House and Pentagon for this move. Hopefully now with the beginning of serious negotiations with Iran, the Obama Administration can shift the US perspective away from its hopeless fixation on that sideshow of a sideshow in the Middle East to Asia, where the future is.

Good work, guys. Very happy to see this.

UPDATE: Probably be on this one all day as news flows in. The Diplomat with a great write-up which observes:

There has been some dispute among defense experts about whether China has the capability to actually enforce its conditions. Defense News quoted an unnamed U.S. defense industry source located in Asia as saying, “Let China run itself crazy trying to enforce this. I just can’t see how China will sustain the enforcement. Too much traffic goes through there. If no country recognizes it, [and] don’t respond to China’s IFF [identification friend or foe] interrogation or VID [visual identification], then this new ADIZ is meaningless.”

Notably, China’s announcement also won it the ire of South Korea, one of the few states in the region that Beijing had thus far avoided offending over sovereignty issues in the past few years. According to the Wall Street Journal, China’s new ADIZ overlaps with about 3,000 square kilometers of South Korea’s own ADIZ. It also encloses Ieodo (Suyan) Rock that South Korea administers but China also claims. Seoul and Beijing will discuss the issue an already scheduled vice defense ministerial-level strategic dialogue in the South Korean capital this week.

Way to go, Beijing! Totally unnecessarily peeving erstwhile friend. This is all about Beijing appealing to domestic audiences. Scary, because those right-wingers aren't going to be appeased until they and others are bleeding...

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Motao goes to Alishan

The Motao. Pure fun on wheels.

Swamped with work I did the only sane thing and ignored it to spend two lovely days biking over Alishan and nearby mountains. The Bike Gods rewarded my faith with prime weather. Even better, a friend who is introducing a new bike and motorcycle camera called the Motao to the market here sent me a free one to test on the trip. What fun I had! As you will see. Motao's Taiwan retailer is www.hands.com.tw -- Tailung Hands. They have 11 stores in Taiwan from K-town to Taipei. You can find them in Breeze and Sogo. Unless I tell you a pic is from the Motao, it is from my Canon Powershot S95. Click on READ ME to enjoy the ride, videos, pictures... what a great time!

Usually we do this ride by riding down Rte 3 through Wufeng, Nantou, Mingjian, and Jhushan, where we pick up the 149. But this time I decided to take the train down to Ershui. That meant we could cut out 45 kms of four lane exhaust eating, stress inducing nightmare on the 3. From Ershui it was only about 12 kms to Jhushan, on the empty 141, across the Changyun Bridge, and then only a couple of kms on the odious 3 to the 149 in Jhushan. In this image Stephen Jack puts together his bike for the ride at the station. The other fellow on this ride was Mike AKA Merican Teachr. Here is my video of a couple of minutes of riding through Ershui town.

As this picture shows, it was going to be a brilliantly sunny day. Yet also cool. Perfect for riding.

We sped across the Changyun Bridge...

...and turned up the 149. Here Steve contemplates the lovely views along the 149. Highly recommend this road with its great views, tea farm and river gorge topography, and gentle grades. From Taichung this is a good century ride. You follow the 149 until it hits the 158, then return to the 3 over the 158, and then back to Taichung.

Tea farms on the 149.

Betel nut and tea bushes...

Leaving the tea farms to ride along the gorge.

From the 149 you turn onto the 149B and start climbing. Here Stephen contemplates the coming nasty grades.

Below the switchbacks on the 149B, tea pickers are hard at work.

Heading around a curve on the 149B.

All over Taiwan, as you ride in mountain areas, you can see people parked, using the free water from little streams to wash their cars.

Looking back on a set of switchbacks.

The Ten Thousand Year Gorge. Video of descending into the gorge.

We rolled down from the summit of the first ridge on the 149B, got drinks at the little yellow bridge, then started climbing up to the tunnel above Caoling. Here is the view back over the little rest stop and some nearby buildings.

Motao takes a break near the tunnel. Here is video of the approach to the tunnel.

Obligatory bike pic. Really too gorgeous a day, I seldom get such lovely days atop the 149B.

In Caoling we had lunch, cheap and filling. If you come this way, avoid Caoling, it is overrun with tourists. Stay in one of the bed and breakfast places on the 169 or 149.

The views are good... here's a couple of minutes of the descent out of Caoling. The sharp curves drop you into the valley of the rivers at the foot of Alishan.

In a moment we were enjoying the road at the base of Alishan as we neared the entrance to the park.

Looking back at Caoling.

A new bridge is going up here.

We headed for the old one in the distance there.

If you're headed for Laiji, you actually pass the point where the sign says LAIJI and keep going over the little red bridge, past the concrete company, and then here is where you turn onto the 155. Prepare to climb some more.

Laiji from the road into it. We left Ershui about 8:30, left Jhushan after breakfast at 9:40, and got to Laiji just before three, with a 45 minute lunch in Caoling. Total distance was about 70 kms, with probably 1200 meters of climbing. Hard work. Here is video of me rolling into Laiji.

Laiji is wonderfully relaxing, someday I am just going to spend a couple of days hanging out here. We got this great room because the place was packed with a tourist group from Taipei, older people hiking. They showed us pictures of their grandchildren, their grandchildren's English teacher, their daughters and sons, and generally were wonderfully energetic and friendly. Great people.

Here is me in our room, image by the Motao, which does both video (full HD baby) and stills (4000 x 3000). Haha. Brace yourselves. I had a lot of fun with the Motao taking selfies. Unlike other popular bike cams, this one has a screen in front, perfect for selfies. And the massive wide angle takes in EVERYTHING. And the wide angle distorts things so much, in some shots I actually look thin. O frabjous day!

Grabbing a Motao selfie in the morning in Laiji.

Leaving Laiji in the morning. Here's video of me leaving Laiji in the morning

Another magnificent morning. Soon we'd be taking off clothing, it was already so hot. Here Stephen, at the other end of the bridge, takes in the scenery.

And these are the easy grades.

Stephen takes a break above Laiji.

Looking back on the 149A to the 169.

Stephen images the tea rail system for getting things up and down steep slopes.

Not a cloud in the sky, the moon looking down, the sun behind. Does it get any better than this?

Tea and betel nut slopes seen from the 149A. Here's a couple of minutes of descending on the 149A.

Climbing up to meet the 169.

A Motao selfie where the 149A joins the 169. I may look relaxed, but I am quailing inside: the hardest part of the ride, a set of 15%+ grades, is next.

Looking back on the 149A.

I stopped where Stephen was resting at the top of one of the killer grades, and we looked down on this driver who had driven down the slope, gotten out, peed, then returned to the car, did a three point turn, and returned up the slope. No toilet at home, I guess. Here's some video of leisurely climbing after the tough part.

World of tea.

Love that feeling of looking back and saying "I climbed that."

Contemplating the view from the first overlook.

Damn good view it was....

So I tried a few selfies with the Motao. LOL.

Did get one good one with the Motao.

Although this ride is brutal, on a clear day it is worth every calorie expended. Tea pickers hard at work.

Tea farms.

Riding up to Taiho town.

As I got some shots of the town, this dog came over to make friends.

Next time I'll take that road....

Money on the bush. I stood here and panned the Motao.

Tea flower.

After Taiho you enter the bamboo forest and there's nothing to see for a couple of kms but bamboo. Finally you break out into an overlook at about 1500 meters. And see this....

Same thing, Motao. I have the Canon exposure set to 1/3 darker.

Then you look off into the distance and realize that there are farms on that mountaintop next to the massif in the middle of the picture. How can I get there? you wonder....

Couldn't resist getting out the Motao for some selfies. Fail!

Finally! This sign means you've reached the peak at just under 1700 meters. Whew! Now I could roll down to Fenchihu and grab lunch.

We reached Fenchihu about 11:15. I had a manly lunch in Fenchihu. Yum.

From Fenchihu we rolled another 7 kms to Shijhuo, then turn onto the 159A, one of the best roads in Taiwan. It was a bit hazy, but you can get an idea of its magnificent views.

This road is a special experience, and I seldom take many photos. You'll just have to come see it. Here's video of me descending on the 159A for a couple of minutes.

One last Motao pic. I love this one. Then it was back to Chiayi and train home. 75 kms, over 1200 meters of climbing on Sunday. Another great ride in the mountains of Taiwan.
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!